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In the modern Bayesian view classical probability theory is simply an extension of conventional
logic, i.e., a quantitative tool that allows for consistent reasoning in the presence of uncertainty.
Classical theory presupposes, however, that—at least in principle—the amount of evidence that an
experimenter can accumulate always matches the size of the hypothesis space. I investigate how the
framework for consistent reasoning must be modified in non-classical situations where hypotheses
form a continuum, yet the maximum evidence accessible through experiment is not allowed to exceed
some finite upper bound. Invoking basic consistency requirements pertaining to the preparation and
composition of systems, as well as to the continuity of probabilities, I show that the modified theory
must have an internal symmetry isomorphic to the unitary group. It thus appears that the only
consistent algorithm for plausible reasoning about a continuum of hypotheses on the basis of finite
evidence is furnished by quantum theory in complex Hilbert space.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Cw, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern Bayesian view classical probability the-
ory with its two key ingredients (i) Bayes’ learning rule
and (ii) maximum entropy priors, is nothing but an ex-
tension of conventional logic, i.e., a quantitative tool that
allows for consistent reasoning also in the presence of un-
certainty [1, 2]. Probabilities are no longer defined as
limits of relative frequencies but as “degrees of belief”
that are subject to certain consistency requirements [3],
and that can be legitimately assigned not just to ensem-
bles but also to individual systems. Bayesian probability
theory is thus more broadly applicable than the ortho-
dox frequentist approach, while yielding identical results
in those cases where a large N limit exists.
Quantum theory is inherently probabilistic: Does it
therefore, too, lend itself to a Bayesian interpretation
[4, 5]? More specifically, does quantum theory, too, rep-
resent some kind of “optimal algorithm” for plausible rea-
soning in a certain, yet to be specified setting? There
are indications that this might be the case, as quantum
theory has been linked to concepts such as a modified
propositional calculus, “learning”, and—most recently—
information processing: (i) One of the earliest attempts
(long before the advent of modern Bayesianism) to ax-
iomatize quantum theory started from a generalisation
of classical propositional calculus, relaxing the require-
ment that all propositions be jointly decidable and re-
sulting in a mathematical structure dubbed “quantum
logic” [6, 7, 8, 9]; the key result of this approach being
that propositions within (an irreducible building block
of) such a “quantum logic” can always be identified with
subspaces of a Hilbert space over some skew field [10].
(This approach fails, however, to give a compelling ar-
∗Electronic address: jochen.rau@web.de
gument why the skew field should be the complex num-
bers, and does not work for dimension two.) (ii) The
discontinuous change of the density matrix upon quan-
tum measurement has been shown to be closely related
to Bayes’ learning rule [11]. (iii) Ongoing research in
the fast-growing field of quantum information and quan-
tum computation keeps revealing intimate connections of
quantum theory with, and its potential power for, infor-
mation processing [12, 13, 14, 15]. There is even a recent
proposal to reduce the key features of quantum theory—
albeit not the full Hilbert space structure—to a small
number of purely information-theoretic constraints [16].
In this paper I attempt to pinpoint the circumstances
under which, and the sense in which, the basic laws of
quantum theory may indeed be considered an “optimal”
set of rules to conduct plausible reasoning in the pres-
ence of uncertainty. But how is this possible if classical
Bayesian theory is already thought to be the universal
algorithm? The basic idea is the following. In a proba-
bilistic model every proposition can be built up, through
logical operations, from a certain minimal set—called the
“hypothesis space”—of elementary propositions. Classi-
cal probability theory assumes that all these elementary
propositions are jointly decidable: An experiment can be
devised (at least in principle) by which the truth values
of all elementary propositions can be jointly ascertained.
Arbitrary repetitions of this experiment will reproduce
with certainty the same result. Such a most refined ex-
periment yields as evidence a string of truth values 0 or 1.
The length of this string is a measure for the maximum
amount of evidence that can be garnered from experi-
ment. It equals the cardinality of the hypothesis space.
At least in theory, therefore, the amount of evidence that
an experimenter can accumulate matches the size of the
hypothesis space.
In quantum theory the situation is radically differ-
ent [17]. There are propositions pertaining to non-
commuting observables that are not jointly decidable.
2For a finite-dimensional quantum system the total
amount of reproducible evidence that can be garnered
from experiment is bounded from above by the Hilbert
space dimension and hence by a finite number; whereas
the hypothesis space comprises all possible pure states
and hence is a continuous manifold. The amount of
evidence that any experimenter can accumulate is thus
strictly smaller than the hypothesis space, not due to
practical limitations but as a matter of principle; maxi-
mal information is not complete [18, 19].
It is the aim of this paper to show that not only does
quantum theory imply a mismatch between hypothesis
space and available evidence, but the converse is also
true: Whenever one is confronted with a situation where
hypotheses form a continuum but total evidence is not
allowed, as a matter of principle, to exceed a finite upper
bound then plausible reasoning about that continuum of
hypotheses, if it is to satisfy some basic consistency re-
quirements, must necessarily follow the rules of quantum
theory.
The proof of this claim presupposes that some basic
consistency requirements for plausible reasoning—with
the notable exception of “joint decidability”—carry over
from the classical case; they will be detailed below. As
the principal subject of inquiry I will then introduce the
group of “consistency-preserving” transformations in the
continuous hypothesis space. Analysis of this group,
which to a good part amounts to a simple dimension-
counting exercise, reveals that it must be isomorphic
to the unitary group U(d) where d is the finite upper
bound on the evidence. This mandates the use of com-
plex Hilbert space, and the identification of propositions
with its subspaces, as the sole consistent framework for
plausible reasoning.
Inferring the Hilbert space structure of quantum the-
ory by means of a dimensional analysis has been pro-
posed before [20]. Like the proof given below, that ear-
lier proposal invoked the correspondence between prob-
ability distributions and measurements (state prepara-
tion), rules for the composition of systems, and the con-
tinuity of probabilities; it focused on demonstrating that
the manifold of (non-normalised) states has dimension
P (d) = d2. However, it provided a rigorous proof only
of P (d) = dµ , µ ∈ N, the cases µ ≥ 3 being excluded
merely on the basis of a non-rigorous, albeit plausible,
“simplicity” requirement. In contrast to the approach
presented here, the earlier proposal did not include a sys-
tematic study of the structure group and its dimension.
And finally, it made extensive use of the concepts “pure
state” and “fiducial state”, as well as of the language of
linear vector spaces: notions that are inspired by quan-
tum theory and already very suggestive of the structure
to be derived, and that we will be trying to avoid here.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In Section II we introduce the basic notions of hypothe-
ses, probabilities, filters and transformations. The latter
constitute a group, which will be the principal subject of
our inquiry. Section III provides a precise definition of
“maximum available evidence”, and argues that it alone
determines the appropriate mathematical framework for
plausible reasoning; “evidence” is the sole parameter of
the theory. Section IV constitutes the core of our anal-
ysis. We inspect carefully, and formulate a number of
consistency requirements pertaining to, the preparation
and composition of systems, as well as the continuity of
probabilities. Thorough dimensional analysis then yields
severe constraints on the structure group and leaves U(d)
as the only allowed choice. We also discuss how this re-
sult may change if any of our assumptions are relaxed.
Finally, we wrap up our investigation with some conclud-
ing remarks in Section V. There is an appendix in which
we give some technical proofs omitted in the main text.
II. BASIC NOTIONS
A. Hypotheses and probabilities
We are concerned with hypotheses about some given
physical system. Some (but not all) of these hypotheses
may be related by logical implication: x ⊆ a means that
if hypothesis x is true then hypothesis a is also true;
hypothesis x is a “refinement” of hypothesis a. We shall
denote the set of all possible refinements of a hypothesis
a by
La := {x | x ⊆ a} . (1)
Logical implication constitutes a partial order: It is (i)
reflexive, x ⊆ x; (ii) antisymmetric, x ⊆ y, y ⊆ x ⇒
x = y; and (iii) transitive, x ⊆ y, y ⊆ z ⇒ x ⊆ z. There
is a unique null element ∅, sometimes called the “absurd
hypothesis”, which is always false and hence implies all
others (ex falso quodlibet): x = ∅ ⇔ x ⊆ a ∀a.
A probability distribution ρ assigns to each hypothesis
a real number between 0 and 1. We shall denote the set
of all probability distributions on La by Pa. These two
sets, La and Pa, are dual to each other in the sense that
any ρ ∈ Pa is completely specified by {ρ(x) | x ∈ La},
and conversely any x ∈ La is completely specified by
{ρ(x) | ρ ∈ Pa}. In Pa there is a partial order mirroring
that in La, defined by
ρ ≤ σ :⇔ ρ(x) ≤ σ(x) ∀x ∈ La . (2)
In keeping with the Bayesian spirit we do not make
any reference to limits of relative frequencies but only
demand that the assignment of probabilities satisfy a
number of consistency requirements. Probability distri-
butions must satisfy the common sense requirement that
the more refined a hypothesis, the smaller its probability
of being true; for any x, y ∈ La,
x ⊆ y ⇔ ρ(x) ≤ ρ(y) ∀ρ ∈ Pa . (3)
Probabilities are calibrated such that ρ(∅) = 0; whereas
they need not necessarily be normalised, i.e., the prob-
ability of the maximal element a ∈ La may be smaller
than one.
3When an observer assigns to a system either of the two
probability distributions ρ or σ with respective “proba-
bility of probabilities” [5] prob(ρ) and prob(σ) then, on
this meta-level, the resulting probability for a hypothesis
x being true is given by the classical Bayes rule
prob(x) = prob(x |ρ) · prob(ρ) + prob(x |σ) · prob(σ)
= prob(x | prob(ρ) · ρ+ prob(σ) · σ) , (4)
where prob(x |ρ) = ρ(x) (and likewise for σ). Such mix-
ing thus yields a new probability distribution which, be-
ing perfectly consistent, must also be contained in the set
Pa. The latter is therefore convex:
ρ, σ ∈ Pa ⇒ tρ+ (1− t)σ ∈ Pa ∀ t ∈ [0, 1] . (5)
Since we do not require probability distributions to be
normalised, arbitrary rescaling is permitted as long as
probabilities never become greater than one:
ρ ∈ Pa ⇒ sρ ∈ Pa ∀ s ∈ [0, 1/ρ(a)] . (6)
B. Filters
There are further consistency requirements related to
the processing of experimental evidence. We imagine an
experiment—we call it a “filter”—that tests a certain hy-
pothesis b and then keeps the system only if b is true, or
else discards it if b is false. In the course of such an ex-
periment the experimenter will acquire new information
and consequently update the probability distribution in
two steps, which are to be carefully distinguished: (i)
upon learning that the filter has been applied, yet with
outcome still unknown; and (ii) upon learning about the
outcome. This can be summarized graphically as follows:
ρ
(i)
→ πbρ
(ii)
→
{ 1
ρ(b)πbρ if b true
0 otherwise (system discarded)
(7)
Step (i) introduces a—yet to be specified—map πb whose
required properties will be discussed below; whereas step
(ii) is a simple rescaling that carries over directly from
the classical Bayes rule.
After step (i) all post-filter (but pre-reading) proba-
bilities are bounded from above by the system’s survival
probability,
πbρ (x) ≤ ρ(b) . (8)
In general these equal their prior values only for the hy-
pothesis being tested and its refinements,
πbρ (x) = ρ(x) ∀ρ ⇔ x ⊆ b . (9)
Filtering must preserve the partial order of probability
distributions,
ρ ≤ σ ⇔ πbρ ≤ πbσ ∀b . (10)
Finally, two filters can be applied in series (without in-
termediate reading of results). If one of the hypotheses
being tested is a refinement of the other then one may
just as well apply the finer filter only; the coarser filter
becomes redundant:
b ⊆ a ⇔ πb ◦ πa = πa ◦ πb = πb . (11)
However, for arbitrary hypotheses not related by logical
implication the order in which the respective filters are
applied may matter, so we do not require that πb ◦ πa =
πa ◦ πb holds for every a, b.
Two hypotheses are said to “contradict” each other,
a ⊥ b, if whenever one of them is true the other must
be false. Operationally this means that successive appli-
cation of the respective filters must always lead to the
system being discarded:
a ⊥ b :⇔ πa ◦ πb = πb ◦ πa = 0 . (12)
A set of hypotheses {bi} shall be called a “set of alter-
native refinements” of a if they are mutually exclusive,
bi ⊥ bj ∀i 6= j, while bi ⊆ a ∀i; the set is “complete” if
the refinements are also collectively exhaustive,
x ⊥ bi ∀i ⇔ x ⊥ a .
An incomplete set of alternative refinements can always
be made complete by adding to it the unique hypothesis
“a, but not any of {bi}”. For a complete set of alternative
refinements we require that the classical sum rule carry
over,
{bi} ≺ a ⇔ ρ(a) =
∑
i
ρ(bi) ∀ρ , (13)
where we have defined “≺” as meaning that {bi} is a
complete set of alternative refinements of a.
If a system is described by a mixture of two probability
distributions ρ, σ then application of the filter πb leads to
a posterior probability
prob(x |πb) = prob(x |ρ, πb) · prob(ρ |πb) +
+prob(x |σ, πb) · prob(σ |πb) (14)
for any x ∈ La, where again on the meta-level we have in-
voked the classical Bayes rule. Requiring that the “prob-
ability of probabilities” is not affected by the presence or
absence of the filter,
prob(ρ |πb) = prob(ρ) , (15)
and using prob(x |ρ, πb) = πbρ (x) we find that
prob(x |πb) = prob(x | prob(ρ) · πbρ+ prob(σ) · πbσ) ,
(16)
i.e., the map πb is linear:
πb(uρ+ vσ) = u πbρ+ v πbσ . (17)
4C. Transformations
Besides filtering, a second important class of experi-
ments are “transformations” that do not involve the test-
ing of any hypothesis, and whose effect amounts to a mere
consistent relabeling of hypotheses; here “consistency”
means that logical implications must be preserved. Such
consistency-preserving transformations form a group Ga
of automorphisms of Pa and La, respectively, that satisfy
(g(ρ))(x) = ρ(g−1(x)) (18)
and
x ⊆ y ⇔ g(x) ⊆ g(y) . (19)
The two types of experiment, (irreversible) filtering and
(reversible) transformation, may be combined. Their or-
der of execution can be exchanged provided the hypoth-
esis being tested is subjected to relabeling, too:
g ◦ πb = πg(b) ◦ g . (20)
If a system is described by a mixture of two proba-
bility distributions ρ, σ then, by a now familiar line of
reasoning, transformation with g ∈ Ga leads to a poste-
rior probability
prob(x |g) = prob(x |ρ, g) · prob(ρ |g) +
+prob(x |σ, g) · prob(σ |g) (21)
for any x ∈ La. Requiring that the “probability of prob-
abilities” is not affected by group action,
prob(ρ |g) = prob(ρ) , (22)
and using prob(x |ρ, g) = (g(ρ)) (x) we find that
prob(x |g) = prob(x | prob(ρ) · g(ρ) + prob(σ) · g(σ)) ,
(23)
hence transformations are linear on Pa:
g(uρ+ vσ) = u g(ρ) + v g(σ) . (24)
III. EVIDENCE AS THE SOLE PARAMETER
Having ascertained the truth of a certain hypothesis
a, the maximum amount of additional evidence that can
still be garnered from a most refined experiment equals
the maximum number of alternative refinements of a; it
shall be denoted by
d(a) := max#{bi | {bi} ≺ a, bi 6= ∅} (25)
and has the obvious properties
x ⊆ y ⇒ d(x) ≤ d(y) , (26)
d(x) = 0 ⇔ x = ∅ . (27)
Furthermore, it is group-invariant,
d(g(x)) = d(x) ∀ x ∈ La, g ∈ Ga . (28)
We are concerned with situations in which this maximum
evidence is finite.
The above definition can be extended to probability
distributions. For any probability distribution ρ ∈ Pa we
first define its “support” supp(ρ) as the unique hypothe-
sis in La for which
supp(ρ) ⊆ x ⇔ πxρ = ρ . (29)
The support transforms in a covariant fashion,
supp(g(ρ)) = g(supp(ρ)) , (30)
and after filtering is constrained to be a refinement of the
hypothesis just verified,
supp(πxρ) ⊆ x , (31)
with strict inequality if and only if x has some non-absurd
refinement whose probability vanishes:
supp(πxρ) ⊂ x ⇔ ∃ y ⊆ x , y 6= ∅ : ρ(y) = 0 . (32)
We shall then define
d(ρ) := d(supp(ρ)) . (33)
Like its counterpart for hypotheses it is group-invariant,
and it has the analogous properties
ρ ≤ σ ⇒ d(ρ) ≤ d(σ) , (34)
d(ρ) = 0 ⇔ ρ = 0 . (35)
Filtering generally produces new evidence and hence
leads to a narrowing of probability distributions,
d(πxρ) ≤ d(ρ) , (36)
even though it is not necessarily supp(πxρ) ⊆ supp(ρ).
We require that the “maximum available evidence” be
the only parameter of the theory. This requirement has
several important ramifications. To begin with, a hy-
pothesis a can be decomposed into ever more accurate
alternative refinements in an iterative, tree-like fashion
by first identifying some initial complete set of alternative
refinements, then decomposing each of these refinements
into a further complete set of alternative refinements, and
so on until this process comes to a halt because hypothe-
ses cannot be refined any further. The absence of other
parameters implies that regardless of the precise path
chosen to arrive at such a maximal decomposition, the
total number of outermost branches at the end of the pro-
cess must always be the same and equal to the maximum
evidence d(a); which entails
{bi} ≺ a ⇒ d(a) =
∑
i
d(bi) . (37)
5Furthermore, whenever two hypotheses are at the same
level of coarse-graining, d(a) = d(b), then the correspond-
ing substructures must be isomorphic: La ∼ Lb and
Pa ∼ Pb. The latter therefore form an equivalence class
that depends on the maximum evidence only, and that
we shall denote by L(d) and P(d), respectively. Like-
wise the associated structure group, too, depends on the
maximum evidence only and shall be denoted by G(d).
Finally, any hypothesis x can have only one group-
invariant property: its level of coarse-graining, d(x). As
long as they are at the same level of coarse-graining, two
hypotheses can always be transformed into one another
by some consistent relabeling,
d(x) = d(y) ⇒ ∃ g ∈ G(d) : y = g(x) (38)
for any x, y ∈ L(d). Thus the set of all hypotheses at the
same level of coarse-graining k,
Mk(d) := {x ∈ L(d) | d(x) = k, k ≤ d} , (39)
constitutes a homogeneous space on which G(d) acts tran-
sitively. The stability group of any y ∈Mk(d) equals the
product of G(k) acting on its substructure Ly ∼ L(k),
and G(d − k) acting on
{x ∈ L(d) | x ⊥ y} ∼ L(d− k) ; (40)
hence the set Mk(d) can be written as the quotient
Mk(d) ∼ G(d)/G(k)⊗ G(d− k) . (41)
This result can be generalised to complete sets of alter-
native refinements. The set
M{ki}(d) := { {xi} ≺ Id | d(xi) = ki,
∑
i
ki = d} , (42)
where we have defined Id as the maximal element of L(d)
with d(Id) = d, again constitutes a homogeneous space
on which G(d) acts transitively. The stability group of
any {yi} ∈ M{ki}(d) now equals the product of all G(ki)
acting on the respective substructures Lyi ∼ L(ki); hence
M{ki}(d) ∼ G(d)/
⊗
i
G(ki) . (43)
IV. DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Preliminaries
The set of probability distributions P(d), the structure
group G(d) and the set of hypotheses Mk(d) may be
discrete or continuous. In case they are continuous we
shall denote the dimensions of the respective manifolds
by
P (d) := dimP(d) , (44)
G(d) := dimG(d) , (45)
Mk(d) := dimMk(d) , (46)
where the quotient representation (41) immediately im-
plies the relation
Mk(d) = G(d) −G(k)−G(d− k) . (47)
In the trivial case d = 1 there is only a single hypoth-
esis, and any (non-normalised) probability distribution
is uniquely specified by the probability of this single hy-
pothesis being true. Therefore,
P (1) = 1 . (48)
Classically, Mk(d) is a discrete set, G(d) is an equally
discrete permutation group, and any (non-normalised)
probability distribution is determined by d continuous
parameters; hence
Pcl(d) = d , Gcl(d) = 0 , Mk cl(d) = 0 . (49)
In contrast, we are concerned here with situations in
which hypotheses form a continuum. In the following we
shall argue that then the only other consistent solution
is
P (d) = d2 , G(d) = d2 , Mk(d) = 2k(d− k) (50)
corresponding to G(d) ∼ U(d). This will involve closer in-
spection of, and some additional assumptions pertaining
to, (i) the preparation and (ii) composition of systems,
as well as (iii) the continuity of probabilities.
B. Preparation
Any knowledge about a physical system, embodied in a
probability distribution ρ ∈ P(d), is the result of a series
of experiments or “preparation procedures” [21] applied
to an initial state of total ignorance
ρ(0)(x) := d(x)/d ∀ x ∈ L(d) . (51)
This initial state of total ignorance is characterised by
invariance under the structure group,
g(ρ(0)) = ρ(0) ∀ g ∈ G(d) , (52)
in accordance with the “principle of indifference” [1].
Preparation procedures may be arbitrary combinations
of (i) testing sets of mutually exclusive hypotheses; (ii)
keeping or discarding the system, with respective prob-
abilities that may depend on the outcome of the test;
and (iii) transformations. In mathematical terms, for
any ρ ∈ P(d) there exist sets of alternative refinements
{b
(α)
i }, sets of associated rescaling factors {λ
(α)
i } that re-
flect the respective probabilities of keeping or discarding
the system, as well as transformations {g(α)} such that
ρ = . . . ◦ g(α) ◦
(∑
i
λ
(α)
i πb(α)
i
)
◦ . . .
. . . ◦ g(1) ◦

∑
j
λ
(1)
j πb(1)
j

 ρ(0) . (53)
6Using linearity and the exchange rule (20) all transfor-
mations can be shifted to the right and absorbed in ρ(0),
leaving behind only filters (pertaining to transformed sets
{b˜} of alternative refinements) and rescaling factors. In
particular, one can define a sequence of posterior proba-
bility distributions
ρ(α) =
(∑
i
λ
(α)
i πb˜(α)
i
)
ρ(α−1) , α ≥ 1 (54)
after the α-th preparation procedure, that eventually ter-
minates to yield ρ.
The left-hand side of the above iteration is some point
on the manifold P(d), hence specified by P (d) real pa-
rameters. The right-hand side, on the other hand, is
uniquely specified by defining (i) the set {b˜i} of alterna-
tive refinements and (ii) for each refinement b˜j, if ascer-
tained, an associated posterior distribution in Pb˜j . Let
ki := d(b˜i) and hence {b˜i} ∈ M{ki}(d). Then due to the
quotient representation (43) the set of alternative refine-
ments is specified by
dimM{ki}(d) = G(d)−
∑
i
G(ki) (55)
real parameters; and a posterior distribution in Pb˜j ∼
P(kj) is specified by P (kj) real parameters. Equating the
total number of parameters on the left-hand side and on
the right-hand side of the iteration equation then yields
a first constraint on the dimensions:
P (d) = G(d)−
∑
i
G(ki) +
∑
i
P (ki) ,
∑
i
ki = d . (56)
In the special case ki = 1 for all i one obtains, using
P (1) = 1,
G(d) = P (d) + (G(1)− 1) · d . (57)
C. Composition
Let a system be composed of two subsystems with re-
spective maximum evidence d(1), d(2) and complete sets
of alternative refinements {x
(1)
i } ≺ Id(1) , {x
(2)
j } ≺ Id(2) .
Then the combined hypotheses {(x
(1)
i , x
(2)
j )}—meaning
“hypothesis x
(1)
i pertaining to system 1 and hypothesis
x
(2)
j pertaining to system 2”—constitute a complete set
of alternative refinements in the composite system. (Here
the Boolean operation “and” is used in a perfectly classi-
cal sense since the two hypotheses refer to different sub-
systems and are thus jointly decidable; whereas for more
general settings we carefully refrain from defining any of
the conventional Boolean operations.) If the hypotheses
about the subsystems are “most refined” then so are the
combined hypotheses about the composite system,
d(x
(1)
i ) = d(x
(2)
j ) = 1 ⇒ d((x
(1)
i , x
(2)
j )) = 1 ; (58)
which implies that the maximum evidence about the
composite system is the product d(1) · d(2).
Probability distributions for the two subsystems are
specified by P (d(1)) or P (d(2)) real parameters, respec-
tively. This means that there is a set of P (d(1)) (not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses {b
(1)
i }, and like-
wise a set of P (d(2)) hypotheses {b
(2)
j }, such that the
probabilities for these selected hypotheses uniquely de-
termine the full distribution in the respective subsystem.
Then for the composite system the full probability dis-
tribution is uniquely specified by the P (d(1)) · P (d(2))
combined hypotheses {(b
(1)
i , b
(2)
j )}; i.e., P (d
(1)d(2)) =
P (d(1))P (d(2)). Given P (1) = 1 this yields a second con-
straint on the dimensions [20]:
P (d) = dµ , µ ∈ N . (59)
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the compo-
sition of transformations. Isolated transformations of the
two subsystems are specified by G(d(1)) or G(d(2)) real
parameters, respectively. Hence, assuming the structure
groups to be Lie groups, there are associated Lie alge-
bras with G(d(1)) generators {X
(1)
i } and G(d
(2)) genera-
tors {X
(2)
j }, respectively. Then for the composite system
there must be a larger Lie algebra whose generators are
isomorphic to the G(d(1)) · G(d(2)) pairs {(X
(1)
i , X
(2)
j )}.
This implies G(d(1)d(2)) = G(d(1))G(d(2)) and thus a
third constraint on the dimensions:
G(d) = 0 or G(d) = dν , ν ∈ N . (60)
D. Continuity
We require that probabilities change under transfor-
mations in a continuous fashion, where “continuity” shall
be defined as follows. Assuming that the structure group
G(d) is a Lie group and hence endowed with a group-
invariant distance measure then it is possible to define,
for any (infinitesimal) δ > 0, an (infinitesimal) neighbor-
hood of the identity element 1G
Gδ(d) := {g ∈ G(d) | dist(g, 1G) < δ} . (61)
Given a probability distribution ρ ∈ P(d), all refinements
of its support have non-vanishing probabilities that are
greater than or equal to
ǫ(ρ) := min{ρ(x) | x ⊆ supp(ρ) , x 6= ∅} > 0 . (62)
Now “continuity” means that probabilities that were ini-
tially greater than zero not suddenly jump to zero upon
an infinitesimal transformation; in more rigorous mathe-
matical terms,
∀ ǫ(ρ) > 0 ∃ δ > 0 : g(ρ) (x) > 0 ∀ x ⊆ supp(ρ) , x 6= ∅ ,
g ∈ Gδ(d) . (63)
7By virtue of Eq. (32) this is equivalent to requiring
supp
[
πsupp(ρ)g(ρ)
]
= supp(ρ) ∀ g ∈ Gδ(d) . (64)
In the remainder of this section we shall always assume
that we are in the infinitesimal neighborhood g ∈ Gδ(d).
For further analysis we introduce an arbitrary auxiliary
hypothesis b,
supp(ρ) ⊆ b ⊆ Id , (65)
where the respective levels of coarse-graining k :=
d(supp(ρ)), l := d(b) and d ≡ d(Id) satisfy
k ≤ l ≤ d . (66)
Moreover, we define three additional auxiliary hypothe-
ses z, b\z and b∗z as follows:
z := supp [πbg(ρ)] ⊆ b , (67)
{b\z, z} :≺ b (68)
and
{b∗z, b\z} :≺ Id . (69)
These definitions imply
z, g(supp(ρ)) ⊆ b∗z . (70)
Within the continuous region the associated levels of
coarse-graining take the values
d(z) = k , d(b\z) = l − k , d(b∗z) = d− l + k . (71)
The proofs of (70) and (71) are given in the appendix.
As supp(ρ) and z are both refinements of b and have
the same level of coarse-graining k, they are both ele-
ments of the set
{x ∈ Lb | d(x) = k, k ≤ l} ∼Mk(l) ; (72)
hence given b, the hypothesis z is uniquely specified by
Mk(l) real parameters. Likewise, z and g(supp(ρ)) are
both refinements of b∗z, again at the same level of coarse-
graining k, and thus elements of the set
{x ∈ Lb∗z | d(x) = k, k ≤ (d− l + k)} ∼ Mk(d− l + k) ;
(73)
so given both b and z, and hence b∗z, the transformed
support g(supp(ρ)) is uniquely specified by Mk(d− l+k)
real parameters. Therefore the total number of param-
eters needed to specify g(supp(ρ)) is the sum Mk(l) +
Mk(d − l + k), which must equal the number of param-
eters that would have been needed without the above
auxiliary construction:
Mk(d) = Mk(l) +Mk(d− l + k) . (74)
In combination with Eq. (47) this implies the fourth and
final constraint on the dimensions:
G(d) =
G(2)− 2G(1)
2
d(d − 1) +G(1) d . (75)
E. Summary
The four constraints (57), (59), (60) and (75) together
with Eq. (47) permit only three solutions: (i) the “clas-
sical case” in which hypotheses constitute a discrete set,
the structure group is equally discrete, and any (non-
normalised) probability distribution is determined by d
continuous parameters:
Pcl(d) = d , Gcl(d) = 0 , Mk cl(d) = 0 ; (76)
(ii) a case in which the set of hypotheses is still discrete
and probability distributions are still determined by d
continuous parameters, yet there is a continuous group
introducing non-trivial phases:
Psc(d) = d , Gsc(d) = d , Mk sc(d) = 0 , (77)
corresponding to G(d) ∼ U(1)⊗d; we may think of this as
a “semiclassical case”; and (iii) the only allowed case in
which hypotheses form a continuum:
Pqu(d) = d
2 , Gqu(d) = d
2 , Mk qu(d) = 2k(d−k) . (78)
Given that G(d) must be a compact Lie group this leads
to G(d) ∼ U(d) [22]. This last case proves our origi-
nal conjecture: Whenever hypotheses form a continuum
but evidence is restricted to be finite, the only consistent
framework for plausible reasoning is the complex Hilbert
space framework of quantum theory.
One may wonder what happens if any of the con-
straints are relaxed. Table I gives an overview of our
requirements for consistent reasoning, the associated di-
mensional constraints, and the additional cases allowed if
a constraint is relaxed in isolation. The requirements per-
taining to preparation and to the composition of states
are not instrumental in—but perfectly consistent with—
deriving the dimensionality of the structure group; with-
out the preparation requirement, however, the connec-
tion is lost between the group dimension and the dimen-
sion of the state manifold. If, instead, the requirement
pertaining to the composition of transformations is re-
laxed then on purely dimensional grounds one additional
structure group becomes possible: SO(d)⊗ SO(d). This
new structure group leaves the dimensions of the various
manifolds of hypotheses Mk(d) unchanged but changes
their topology, e.g., M1(2) becomes isomorphic to the
surface of a torus rather than the surface of a sphere. The
physical significance of such topologies that are not sim-
ply connected remains elusive. However, they might be
in conflict with the requirement that the set of probabil-
ity distributions be convex [20]. Finally, if the continuity
requirement is relaxed in isolation then the dimensions of
group and state manifold, while constrained to be equal,
may be higher powers of d. Again it is not clear what
the physical significance of such a behavior would be.
8TABLE I: Overview of requirements for consistent reasoning, associated dimensional constraints, and additional cases allowed
if a constraint is relaxed in isolation.
Extra cases allowed if relaxed
Requirement Implied dimensional constraint Dimensions Structure group
Preparation G(d) = P (d) + (G(1) − 1) d P (d) = dµ , µ 6= ν —
Composition (states) P (d) = dµ — —
Composition (transformations) G(d) = 0, dν G(d) = d(d− 1) SO(d) ⊗ SO(d)
Continuity G(d) = G(2)−2G(1)
2
d(d− 1) +G(1) d G(d) = P (d) = dµ , µ ≥ 3 many
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the non-classical situation in which
hypotheses form a continuum, whereas the maximum
available evidence is bounded from above by some finite
integer d. Employing the basic notions of hypotheses,
probabilities, filters and transformations, and invoking a
small number of consistency requirements pertaining to
the preparation and composition of systems, as well as to
the continuity of probabilities, we have shown that then
the group of consistency-preserving transformations must
be isomorphic to U(d). Our proof highlights the pivotal
role played by the finite maximum evidence alias Hilbert
space dimension d as the sole parameter of the theory,
confirming an earlier intuition by Fuchs [23].
We have thus singled out complex Hilbert space as the
only consistent framework for plausible reasoning. Quan-
tum theory is indeed an “island in theoryspace” [24] dis-
tinguished by a high degree of internal consistency. In
particular, alternative models in real [25] or quaternionic
[26] Hilbert spaces that are allowed by traditional quan-
tum logic [7] (but that have already run into difficulties
for other reasons such as the lack of a de Finetti rep-
resentation [27]) now seem very difficult to justify. We
also note that nowhere did we make reference to spe-
cific length or energy scales; hence even though quantum
phenomena are most prevalent in the microscopic world,
there is nothing in the above line of argument that re-
stricts it to that domain.
Once identified with quantum theory in complex
Hilbert space, the various notions of statistical inference
employed in this paper can be easily translated into the
familiar language of conventional quantum theory; these
correspondences are summarised in Table II. As is well
known, quantum theory entails a number of counterin-
tuitive features. We recall a few, using the terminol-
ogy of this article: (i) The classical Boolean operations
“and”, “or” are not well defined for arbitrary hypothe-
ses. Indeed, even though in certain special cases they
are implicit in our above definitions of πb, ⊥ or ≺, we
have avoided employing these notions in our line of ar-
gument. (ii) Some pairs of hypotheses are not jointly de-
cidable, making quantum theory inherently probabilistic.
(Two hypotheses x, y ∈ L(d) are said to be jointly decid-
able if there is a complete set of alternative refinements
{bi}i∈I ≺ Id with subsets of the index set Ix, Iy ⊆ I such
that {bi}i∈Ix ≺ x and {bi}i∈Iy ≺ y.) (iii) It is not possi-
ble to assign to all hypotheses a preexisting truth value,
i.e., to mimic quantum theory with a hidden-variables
theory [28].
Niels Bohr once remarked that physics in general, and
quantum theory in particular, was to be regarded “not
so much as the study of something a priori given” but
rather as the development of “methods for ordering and
surveying human experience” [29]. I hope this paper will
have further corroborated the deep truth of this state-
ment, provided we interpret “ordering and surveying hu-
man experience” as meaning “consistent reasoning about
hypotheses pertaining to the physical world”.
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APPENDIX
1. Proof of Eq. (70)
That z ⊆ b∗z follows directly from their respective def-
initions. The second logical implication in Eq. (70) can
be shown as follows. It is
ρ
(
g−1(b)\supp
(
πg−1(b)ρ
))
= 0 (A.1)
and hence
ρ
(
g−1(b)\g−1(z)
)
= 0 , (A.2)
which implies
g(ρ) (b\z) = 0 (A.3)
and further
g(supp(ρ)) ⊥ b\z . (A.4)
This yields
g(supp(ρ)) ⊆ b∗z , (A.5)
Q.E.D.
9TABLE II: Correspondence between the terminology of statistical inference employed in this paper and the terminology of
conventional quantum theory.
Statistical inference Quantum theory
Name Symbol or relation Name Symbol or relation
Hypothesis x Projector Pˆx, x is subspace of Hilbert space
Probability distribution ρ Density matrix ρˆ
Probability ρ(x) Probability tr(ρˆPˆx)
Logical implication x ⊆ y — PˆxPˆy = PˆyPˆx = Pˆx
Filter pibρ — PˆbρˆPˆb
Contradiction x ⊥ y Orthogonality PˆxPˆy = PˆyPˆx = 0
Complete set of alternative refinements {bi} ≺ a Orthogonal decomposition Pˆa =
P
i Pˆbi
Transformation g(ρ) Unitary transformation Uˆ ρˆUˆ†
Level of coarse graining d(x) Dimension of subspace tr(Pˆx)
Most refined hypothesis d(x) = 1 1-dim. subspace (ray) Pˆx = |χ〉〈χ|
2. Proof of Eq. (71)
Eq. (36) and group invariance imply
d(πbg(ρ)) ≤ d(g(ρ)) = d(ρ) ; (A.6)
while b ⊇ supp(ρ) and the continuity condition (64) yield
d(πbg(ρ)) ≥ d(πsupp(ρ)g(ρ)) = d(ρ) . (A.7)
Together these inequalities give
d(πbg(ρ)) = d(ρ) (A.8)
and hence d(z) = k, Q.E.D.
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